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Introduction
• The United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, adopted by the 
International Maritime Organization 
(IMO), distinguishes between piracy and 
armed robbery, and it provides a 
definition of maritime piracy that 
includes only attacks perpetrated in 
international waters.i 
• The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) 
of the International Chamber of 
Commerce instead defines maritime 
piracy as ‘any act of boarding or 
attempting to board any ship with the 
apparent intent or capability to use force 
in the furtherance of the act’.2  
• This study adopts the IMB’s broad 
definition, as the distinction between 
piracy and armed robbery is not 
particularly relevant in terms of analysis 
and comparison of patterns of maritime 
piracy.
  iiThe available data before 2006 are scarce and present a large 
number of missing information.
1. What is 
maritime 
piracy? 
• Data on piracy incidents used in this 
research originate from the Global 
Integrated Shipping Information System 
of the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO). 
• The IMO has been collecting data on acts 
of piracy and armed robbery, both actual 
and attempted, since 1983.
 
• The IMO database includes information 
on the time and location of the incident, 
the targeted vessel, the raiding party 
and the attack’s consequences.
• The IMO database collects reports by 
masters and ship owners, and problems 
of underreporting could exist.
• Reasons for non-reporting include costs 
related to the increase in insurance 
premiums and to staying in port during 
the police investigations, as well as 
damage to the company’s reputation. 
• Although this limitation should be taken 
into account in the interpretation of the 
results, the literature does not identify 
any specific patterns of non-reporting. 
• This analysis considers 2,493 attacks 
occurred from January 2006 to May 
2014.ii 
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• The phenomenon of maritime piracy 
dates back to the beginning of seafaring.1  
• Since the 1980s, maritime piracy has 
re-emerged as an international problem 
because of a significant rise in the   
recorded attacks.
• The security of maritime routes is a 
matter of concern for national 
governments, ship owners and trade 
companies whose vessels face the risk of 
being robbed of their cargo or hijacked 
for a ransom.
• Maritime piracy is a complex 
phenomenon that, according to the 
definition used, comprises different 
criminal behaviours (e.g., theft, robbery, 
kidnapping), modus operandi (e.g., 
massive armed attacks, insiders, use of 
skiffs and mother ships) and targets 
(e.g., the goods carried on the ship, the 
belongings of the crew, the ship itself).
• These features may change over time 
and over space. Looking at the evolution 
and peculiarities of this phenomenon in 
different areas can help to identify 
regularities and implement more 
effective countermeasures.  
• In recent years, Transcrime has been 
active in promoting the idea that actual 
reductions of complex crime phenomena 
can be reached through specific 
prevention strategies. This approach 
relies on accurate analyses of the 
available data to identify regular patterns 
and risk factors.
• This study summarises some of the 
findings that emerged from the research 
Transcrime conducted on maritime 
piracy, using a comparative approach.
 
2. What  do 
we know on 
maritime 
piracy? 
• The academic literature on piracy varies 
in scope and methods. Most 
contributions come from the political 
sciences and law adopting a qualitative 
approach. Empirical or quantitative 
studies analysing data on piracy 
incidents are less common, although 
their number has increased in recent 
years.3 
• Piracy incidents show a spatial and 
temporal variation.4 However, most 
studies analyse worldwide patterns of 
piracy incidents or focus on specific 
areas (e.g., Somalia, Indo-Pacific region) 
rather than comparing patterns and 
trends across regions. 
• A comparative approach could help 
understand such variations across 
regions in terms of frequency and trends 
of piracy incidents, victimised vessels’ 
characteristics and pirates’ modus 
operandi.
3. The 
dataset
  i Article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea UNCLOS, United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, 1982. defines piracy as any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of 
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the 
passengers of a private ship of a private aircraft, and 
directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or 
against persons or property on board of such ship or 
aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place 
outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship 
or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate 
ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act 
described in subparagraph (a) or (b).
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• Maritime piracy is a global phenomenon. 
Recorded attacks occurred in the seas of 
62 countries in four out of the ﬁve 
continents.
 
• Maritime piracy is also highly 
concentrated. Almost 68% of attacks 
occurred near only seven countries 
(Indonesia, Yemen, Malaysia, Somalia, 
Nigeria, Oman, Bangladesh and India). 
Meanwhile, the seas surrounding 
Oceania, the North Atlantic Ocean and 
the largest part of the Paciﬁc Ocean did 
not experience any attack in the period 
considered.
• The analysis of these concentrations 
allows to identify three main risky areas:
1) The Malacca strait and the seas around 
Malaysia and Indonesia; 
2) The Gulf of Guinea in the Atlantic 
Ocean; 
3) The East African seas from the Gulf of 
Aden and the Arabic sea to Kenya and 
Tanzania all along Somalia’s coastline.
• In East and West Africa, the areas 
highlighted correspond almost entirely 
to the high-risk areas deﬁned by the 
BMP45 and the Interim Guidelines for 
Owners, Operators and Masters for 
protection against piracy in the Gulf of 
Guinea region.6 
• Some relevant concentrations are also 
present close to ports in India, 
Bangladesh, Vietnam and South-Central 
America (Figure 1).
5. How  is
maritime 
piracy  
changing? 
Figure 1. Concentrations of maritime 
piracy attacks from 2006 to 2014 (May)
• The number of attacks has an irregular 
trend. From 2006 to 2011, there was a 
boom in the number of events recorded. 
During these five years, the number of 
attacks increased more than five times. 
In the following two years, the number 
dropped significantly but remained 
higher than in 2006.
• This general trend is largely due to the 
attacks occurred in the East African seas 
and in the Indian Ocean (Figure 2).
 
• In 2011, these waters accounted for 
more attacks than all of the other areas 
combined. In 2013, they comprised about 
half of the events that occurred in West 
Africa.
• The trends in West African and South 
East Asian areas are more constant over 
time. Despite some little variations, the 
number of attacks increased constantly 
from 2006 to 2013.
Figure 2. Number of attacks by 
geographic area from 2006 to 2013
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• The number of events in international 
waters dropped in 2012 in connection 
with the reduction of the attack in the 
Arabic sea.
• This trend relates to the modus operandi 
of the Somali pirates who are more likely 
to attack steaming vessels in the high 
seas.
• The West African pirates are more prone 
to attack anchored or berthed ships. 
• The increasing number of attacks in the 
Gulf of Guinea largely explains the rise in 
the events reported in port areas from 
2010 onward. 
Figure 3. Number of attacks by location 
from 2006 to 2014 (May)
0
50
100
150
200
250
350
300
06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14
May
In international waters In port area
In territorial waters
4. Maritime piracy: a 
global but concentrated 
phenomenon
  
 
2
3
1
0 600 1.200  Nml
High
Low
Density of 
maritime piracy 
attacks
• Maritime piracy is a global phenomenon. 
Recorded attacks occurred in the seas of 
62 countries in four out of the ﬁve 
continents.
 
• Maritime piracy is also highly 
concentrated. Almost 68% of attacks 
occurred near only seven countries 
(Indonesia, Yemen, Malaysia, Somalia, 
Nigeria, Oman, Bangladesh and India). 
Meanwhile, the seas surrounding 
Oceania, the North Atlantic Ocean and 
the largest part of the Paciﬁc Ocean did 
not experience any attack in the period 
considered.
• The analysis of these concentrations 
allows to identify three main risky areas:
1) The Malacca strait and the seas around 
Malaysia and Indonesia; 
2) The Gulf of Guinea in the Atlantic 
Ocean; 
3) The East African seas from the Gulf of 
Aden and the Arabic sea to Kenya and 
Tanzania all along Somalia’s coastline.
• In East and West Africa, the areas 
highlighted correspond almost entirely 
to the high-risk areas deﬁned by the 
BMP45 and the Interim Guidelines for 
Owners, Operators and Masters for 
protection against piracy in the Gulf of 
Guinea region.6 
• Some relevant concentrations are also 
present close to ports in India, 
Bangladesh, Vietnam and South-Central 
America (Figure 1).
5. How  is
maritime 
piracy  
changing? 
Figure 1. Concentrations of maritime 
piracy attacks from 2006 to 2014 (May)
• The number of attacks has an irregular 
trend. From 2006 to 2011, there was a 
boom in the number of events recorded. 
During these five years, the number of 
attacks increased more than five times. 
In the following two years, the number 
dropped significantly but remained 
higher than in 2006.
• This general trend is largely due to the 
attacks occurred in the East African seas 
and in the Indian Ocean (Figure 2).
 
• In 2011, these waters accounted for 
more attacks than all of the other areas 
combined. In 2013, they comprised about 
half of the events that occurred in West 
Africa.
• The trends in West African and South 
East Asian areas are more constant over 
time. Despite some little variations, the 
number of attacks increased constantly 
from 2006 to 2013.
Figure 2. Number of attacks by 
geographic area from 2006 to 2013
East Africa + Indian Ocean Southeast Asia
West Africa Others
080706
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
111009 1312
• The number of events in international 
waters dropped in 2012 in connection 
with the reduction of the attack in the 
Arabic sea.
• This trend relates to the modus operandi 
of the Somali pirates who are more likely 
to attack steaming vessels in the high 
seas.
• The West African pirates are more prone 
to attack anchored or berthed ships. 
• The increasing number of attacks in the 
Gulf of Guinea largely explains the rise in 
the events reported in port areas from 
2010 onward. 
Figure 3. Number of attacks by location 
from 2006 to 2014 (May)
0
50
100
150
200
250
350
300
06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14
May
In international waters In port area
In territorial waters
4. Maritime piracy: a 
global but concentrated 
phenomenon
  
 
2
3
1
0 600 1.200  Nml
High
Low
Density of 
maritime piracy 
attacks
The only relevant hot spot was the area 
around the straits of Sunda, Karimata and 
Malacca close to Indonesia. Sporadic 
attacks occurred close to the Somalian 
coasts and in the Gulf of Aden.
Dramatic reduction of the attacks in the 
Arabic Sea and in all East African waters. 
The Gulf of Guinea and the Malacca strait 
remained relevant hot spots.
Major concentrations appeared in the 
international waters of the Arabic sea and 
close to the coasts of Kenya and the 
Republic of Tanzania. The Gulf of Guinea 
became a relevant hot area.
Considerable increase in the number of 
attacks in the Gulf of Aden and in the 
waters oﬀ the coast of Somalia
Spatio-temporal evolution of maritime piracy hot areas
2006-2007 2008-2009 2010-2011 2012-2013
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6. How do 
pirates 
attack?
• The organisation of pirates varies, 
ranging from small groups to complex 
organisations with up to 200 members 
each.7 
• Differences exist both within and across 
regions.
• Pirates around the Horn of Africa tend to 
be well-organised, and this influences 
the type of attacks conducted, which 
often consist in the hijacking of the entire 
vessel.
• In Southeast Asia, most attacks are 
instead petty thefts from anchored and 
berthed vessels, and they require less 
organised and smaller groups.8 
• Pirates generally conduct their attacks 
in one or two skiffs—i.e., small and 
fast-moving boats. Off of Somali coasts, 
the use of mother ships—larger ships 
carrying skiffs and equipment—is 
common, especially in the case of 
attacks occurring far from the shore.9  
• Pirates usually attack at a speed 
between 20 and 30 knots, and they 
conduct their attacks for about 30–45 
minutes before taking control of the 
targeted vessel.10 
• Pirates usually carry weapons, although 
the use of violence depends on the 
attack’s aim (kidnap for ransom or 
robbery) and on their interaction with the 
crew (Figure 4).
• Somali pirates are more involved in 
hijackings and generally use weapons to 
intimidate people on board the targeted 
vessel, but actual violence is not 
common.11  
• Nigerian pirates are instead more 
violent and are responsible for the 
highest amount of physical violence and 
number of killings.12 
• Somali pirates usually conduct their 
attacks armed with guns and 
rocket-propelled grenades (RPG).  The 
use of guns is frequent in West Africa 
(34.2%). Pirates in Southeast Asia and in 
other regions prefer to use knives during 
attacks (Figure 5). 
• The types of attacks characterising the 
various regions affect this difference.
• In Southeast Asia, pirates mainly target 
ships in port or at anchor and the 
interaction with the crew is less 
frequent. They rarely need to use 
weapons unless when spotted on board 
of the ship.
• The pirates need weapons – and guns in 
particular– when the aim of an attack is 
to hijack the ship and to threaten the 
kidnapped crew until a ransom is paid.
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• Several factors influence ships’ 
vulnerability to pirate attacks.
• The vessels’ characteristics play a 
relevant role in terms of both likelihood of 
attack and probability of success.
• The type of ship is relevant to identify 
vulnerable vessels. In general, 
slow-moving and old vessels are more 
vulnerable to attacks.14 
• Pirates particularly target bulk carriers 
and general cargo vessels. 
Containerships, tankers, chemical and 
products tankers, and liquid gas carriers 
follow.15 
• Differences across regions emerge. In 
particular, pirates attack carriers in all 
regions except for West Africa, where this 
type of ship accounts for only 12.4% of all 
attacks.
• Container ships are particularly 
victimised in non-traditional piracy 
regions (e.g., South America), whereas 
pirates target barge carriers and tugboats 
in Southeast Asia more than in other 
regions (Figure 6).
• Different pirate strategies and different 
types of vessels sailing particular sea 
routes can explain these dissimilarities.
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Figure 6. Type of victimised vessels, 
by geographic area
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Figure 4. Consequences for the crew 
during the attack, by geographic area
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smaller number of crew members. 
• Finally, the ship’s status when it is 
attacked also influences its vulnerability.
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are more vulnerable to attacks, as they 
are easier to board and require slower 
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• The choice of the target also depends on 
the typical behaviour of vessels in 
specific areas. Indeed, vessels tend not 
to anchor in high-risk areas.  
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coast occur mainly against steaming 
ships (79.1%). On the contrary, most 
piracy incidents in Southeast Asia 
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Figure 8. Near repeated patterns in the three areas considered• According to available data, only about 
11% of the ships suffered more than one 
attack in the period considered. 
• On average, more than one year (402 
days) passed between two repeated 
attacks.
• These figures are likely to be 
underestimated due to underreporting. 
However, the results are reasonable, 
considering that a pirate’s attack is not a 
regular event and also considering the 
large number of ships that sail the seas 
daily. 
• Therefore, focusing on areas rather than 
on ships is advisable to find regularities 
in victimization patterns.
• In all of the geographic areas 
considered, evidences exist of repeated 
victimization in the same location. 
• When an event occurs in a specific place, 
the likelihood of a subsequent attack in 
the same area is extremely high on the 
same or on the next day, and it remains 
significantly higher up to five days from 
the initial incident. 
• The pirates’ modus operandi may explain 
these different patterns of victimization 
(Figure 8).
• In East Africa and Southeast Asia, the 
risk of future attacks is clustered in time 
but not in space. The high probability of a 
repeated event during the following week 
affects a large area (up to 7 nml in East 
Africa and up to 9 nm in Southeast Asia). 
Pirates are more dynamic and operate in 
larger areas than in West Africa. 
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9. Conclusions 
and next steps 
• The results show clearly that the 
geographical area of the attack 
influences the likelihood and the 
characteristics of the event. 
• The three main clusters identified (East 
Africa, West Africa and Southeast Asia) 
differ in terms of nature of the attack, 
types of ships victimised, weapons used 
and pirates’ violence. 
• These analyses suggest the usefulness 
of a comparative approach to identify 
differences and peculiarities of maritime 
piracy entailing tailored and effective 
military and non-military counter-piracy 
measures.
• Currently, Transcrime is involved in the 
Project IPATCH,iii which aims to evaluate 
and suggest non-military 
countermeasures against maritime 
piracy. 
• During this project, Transcrime will 
define a risk assessment model to 
highlight possible risk scenarios. This 
outcome will rely on an in-depth analysis 
of the attacks in order to identify the 
factors that may generate crime 
opportunities for pirates.
• As with any kind of analysis, the 
available data quality and consistency 
are fundamental to obtain trustable 
results.
• Instead, data on maritime piracy are 
often missing, incomplete or 
unsystematised due to underreporting 
or to issues connected to the different 
definitions used.
• More efforts should be made to avoid 
those problems that affect the analysis 
reliability, thus hindering the effective 
prevention of the next evolution of this 
phenomenon.
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